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FRACKING AND FEDERALISM CHOICE 
MICHAEL BURGER† 
In Response to David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the 
Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
Hydraulic fracturing—also referred to as “fracking”—has spread across 
the United States over the last two decades in dramatic fashion.1 There are 
now active fracking operations in approximately thirty states,2 with some 
oil- and gas-rich shale “plays,” such as the Marcellus and Bakken shale 
formations, spanning multiple states.3 The emergence of this extraction 
technique has been accompanied by an abundance of controversy, much of 
it surrounding the often-undisclosed chemical contents of the fluid mixtures 
that fracking operators inject deep underground. Critics of fracking cite the 
risk of groundwater contamination, inadequate regulation of wastewater at 
 
† Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks to Jody Free-
man, Amy Mall, and Hannah Wiseman for their insights, and to Gregory Hoffman for his 
research assistance. 
1 For an interactive diagram of the fracking process, see Graham Roberts et al., Extracting 
Natural Gas from Rock, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/ 
27/us/fracking.html. For a summary of shale gas’s role in our national energy policy, see Energy in 
Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012). 
2 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, FRACKING FACTS: PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM 
THE RISKS OF FRACKING 2 (2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/frackingrisks.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LOWER 48 STATES SHALE PLAYS (2011), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale_gas.pdf.  
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the surface, and the impacts of the industry on local communities as driving 
their opposition.4 That fracking is exempt in important ways from several 
federal environmental laws only exacerbates these critics’ concerns.5 Given 
its national implementation, its environmental impact both locally and 
across state lines, and its uncertain risks, fracking raises a critical question: 
Who should regulate the practice—the federal government or the states?6  
To date, fracking discourse has focused on whether environmental pro-
tections under existing laws ought to be strengthened and whether the 
exemptions to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 7  the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),8 and the Emergency Planning & 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)9 ought to be revoked.10 Professor 
 
4 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Shift by Cuomo on Gas Drilling Prompts Both Anger and Praise, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/nyregion/with-new-delays-a-growing- 
sense-that-gov-andrew-cuomo-will-not-approve-gas-drilling.html (discussing Governor Cuomo’s 
agreement to delay hydraulic fracturing in response to environmentalists’ entreaties to conduct 
more studies on the impacts of this drilling on public health). 
The protest movement has even inspired a feature film, Promised Land, co-written by and 
starring John Krasinski and Matt Damon. See Donna Freydkin, A ‘Land’ of Plenty for Writer/Actor 
Matt Damon, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2013/01/04/ 
matt-damon-promised-land/1807047/. 
5 Fracking, Federal Laws: Loopholes & Exemptions, ENVTL. DEF. CENTER, http://www.edcnet.org/ 
learn/current_cases/fracking/federal_law_loopholes.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
6 Elsewhere I refer to this as a question of “federalism choice.” See Michael Burger, Con-
sistency Conflicts and Federalism Choice: Marine Spatial Planning Beyond the States’ Territorial Seas, 41 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10602, 10611 (2011). 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006). 
8 Id. §§ 6901–6992k. 
9 Id. §§ 11001–11050. 
10 See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas 
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 145-46 (2009) 
[hereinafter Wiseman, Untested Waters]. Professor Wiseman has led academic discourse in this 
area by compiling and analyzing state and federal regulations and identifying critical regulatory 
gaps. See id. at 142-82 (describing a host of regulatory failures at the state and federal levels); 
Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 241-75 
(2010) (discussing failures in regulation in the Appalachian region); see also Hannah Wiseman, 
Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 1, 7 n.42, 8-12 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/111/ 
1_Wiseman.pdf. (discussing a move by the EPA to require disclosure of chemicals used in fracking 
operations); Hannah Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 75-80), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2017104 (offering policy recommendations in light of recent developments in fracking 
practices and regulatory response). Environmental advocacy groups, such as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, have examined regulatory failures at the state level and advocated increased 
federal involvement. See, e.g., MATTHEW MCFEELEY, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, STATE 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE RULES AND ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARISON 
(2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/Fracking-Disclosure-IB.pdf. Industry groups, 
such as the Natural Gas Alliance, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America, have opposed new federal regulatory measures. See, e.g., AM. 
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David Spence tackles these problems in a different way, beginning by 
asking “which level of government can better implement” good policy.11 
Using this “policy-neutral” 12  approach, Professor Spence comes to the 
conclusion that there is no need for a comprehensive or uniform federal 
fracking regime.13 Thus, in Professor Spence’s view, Congress should not 
create a new federal–state permitting system based on the principles of 
cooperative federalism, nor should the EPA organize and implement its 
existing authority to set up a one-stop shop for fracking permits.14 At the 
same time, Professor Spence concludes that there may be a role for federal 
regulation of specific aspects of fracking operations that are known to cause 
interstate environmental harm, and that further risk assessments and scientific 
studies may reveal a need for a stronger federal role in other areas, as well.15  
Professor Spence’s project is intriguing and is among the first to take a 
serious look at fracking regulation through the lens of the federalism-choice 
question.16 His Article also contributes to the sparse scholarly literature on 
fracking by offering a preliminary comparative analysis of the dynamics 
between state agency identity, regulatory strategy, and stringency.17  
 
PETROLEUM INST., “THE PRESIDENT’S BACKWARD ENERGY POLICY WON’T HELP 
LOWER GASOLINE PRICES”: ENERGY MYTHS & FACTS 2 (2012), available at http://www. 
api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Energy-Myths-and-Facts.pdf (arguing that a “potential 
avalanche of new rules will discourage further natural gas development”). This back-and-forth has 
also been influenced by major media events, including the release of the documentary film 
Gasland, and major investigatory series by the New York Times and Pro Publica. See Ian Urbina, 
Drilling Down Series, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/DRILLING_ 
DOWN_SERIES.html (last updated May. 15, 2012); Fracking: Gas Drilling’s Environmental Threat, 
PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/series/fracking (last updated July 9, 2012). See also 
NatGasNow, The Truth About Gasland, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
feature=player_embedded&v=Y1W8MnveFq8 (arguing, in a film produced by America’s Natural 
Gas Alliance, that Gasland “is a deeply flawed documentary” and “gets several important facts 
wrong”). The dynamics of political, environmental, and industry agendas is theorized and 
examined in Charles Davis & Katherine Hoffer, Federalizing Energy? Agenda Change and the Politics 
of Fracking, 45 POL’Y SCI. 221 (2012). The authors describe how “policy actors” have alternately 
appealed to state or national audiences when strategies at one or the other level fail. Id. at 227. 
11 David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 460 (2013).  
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 507-08. Given that the politics of federalism has already formed to some extent, 
“neutral” analysis is probably not possible. See Davis & Hoffer, supra note 10, at 224 (noting how 
“actions taken by one group will shape the actions of the other” in federalism controversies). 
14 See Spence, supra note 11, at 503-04. 
15 Id. at 506-08. 
16 See also Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at 
A23 (arguing for uniform federal regulation of fracking).  
17 See Spence, supra note 11, at 453-54 (arguing that Texas’s and Pennsylvania’s choices to 
regulate fracking through existing regulatory regimes for oil and gas production led to increased 
drilling activity in those states versus in New York); Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 10, at 
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In this Response, I offer a set of constructive challenges to Professor 
Spence’s Article. In Part I, I argue that fracking’s federalism-choice ques-
tion has already been answered, and that but for the outdated and under-
justified exemptions mentioned above, fracking is already under the juris-
diction of federal regulators. In Part II, I conduct an alternative federalism-
choice analysis that adds to Professor Spence’s analysis in three ways. First, 
I balance his analysis by examining rationales commonly used to justify 
decentralization, rather than federalization, of environmental law. Second, I 
argue that given the fast-paced growth in drilling activity across the country, 
fracking’s environmental impacts should be analyzed with regard to their 
cumulative effects. When so viewed, it is clear that fracking gives rise to 
interstate, and even national, problems that must be addressed accordingly. 
Third, I argue that widespread impacts on rural America weigh in favor of 
federal regulation.18  
I. FRACKING AND FEDERAL LAW 
Professor Spence’s Article is the first scholarly attempt to reckon the 
“matching principle”19 with fracking, and he offers a detailed and rigorous 
examination of the scope of fracking’s impact, not only on groundwater 
contamination and wastewater disposal, but also on water supply, communi-
ty character, and fugitive methane emissions.20 Yet Professor Spence also 
misses a critical point: Congress has already acted to federalize drinking 
water regulation and to oversee the management of hazardous waste,21 even 
though most individual contamination events occur entirely within a single 
state or locality. Similarly, Congress has regulated toxic chemicals,22 even 
where there is no immediate interstate effect. Yet, fracking has been 
 
157-70 (examining regulatory mechanisms in Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, and a few other 
states). But see, e.g., Davis & Hoffer, supra note 10, at 223 (noting that although most states 
encourage development of fracking for economic development purposes, a smaller number of 
states have “exhibited greater sensitivity to environmental concerns”).  
18 Professor Spence acknowledges that there may well be “broader rationales” for federaliza-
tion that focus on “moral rights.” Spence, supra note 11, at 436 n.19.  
19 The matching principle reasons that the scope of a given problem should match the re-
sponsible institution’s jurisdiction, thereby ensuring the greatest match between a problem and an 
institution’s response. See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133, 158-60 (2005) (“As a general structural matter, it is more efficient 
and effective to address environmental problems through institutions of equivalent scope as the 
problem in question.”). 
20 See Spence, supra 11, at 479-93. 
21 See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300i-2 (2006); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f. 
22 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692. 
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specifically exempted from these comprehensive regimes even though the 
practice appears to fit squarely within the competencies of the respective 
programs.23 These carve-outs are based on analyses and political calculations 
that are either outdated, unjustified, or both. Any thorough analysis of the 
federalism issues at play must begin by acknowledging the fact that but for 
these under-theorized exemptions, many of the matching questions Profes-
sor Spence poses would already have been definitively answered. 
A. Why Fracking Is Not Already Federally Regulated 
The SDWA mandates the regulation of underground injection activities 
in order to protect groundwater resources,24 and the EPA regulates these 
activities through its Underground Injection Control (UIC) program.25 
Under the UIC permitting process, states, or in cases in which the EPA has 
not approved the state program, the EPA, regulate the permitting, siting, 
construction, operation, monitoring, and closure of injection wells.26 As a 
general matter, oil and gas injection wells—including so-called “enhanced 
recovery” wells like fracking wells—are regulated under the UIC program’s 
Class II requirements. 27  However, in the 2005 Energy Policy Act 
(EPAct),28 Congress amended the definition of “underground injection” 
under the SDWA specifically to exclude “the underground injection of 
fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels)” associated with frack-
ing.29 That is, since the passage of EPAct, fracking operations can legally 
inject anything but diesel into the ground without obtaining a UIC permit.30  
According to Professor Spence, Congress created the fracking ex-
emption after an EPA study showed “that the injection of fracking fluids 
into coalbed methane wells pose[d] little or no threat to drinking water 
 
23 See supra notes 5 & 7-10 and accompanying text. 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(B) (stating that applicants for underground injection permits 
must “satisfy the State that the underground injection will not endanger drinking water sources”). 
25 See 40 C.F.R § 144.11 (2011) (prohibiting underground injections except those performed 
in authorized wells or conducted under a UIC permit).  
26 See id. § 144.1; EPA, GUIDANCE FOR STATE SUBMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 1425 OF 
THE SAFE WATER DRINKING ACT 13-17 (n.d.), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/ 
pdfs/guidance/guide_uic_guidance-19_primacy_app.pdf.  
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 144.6(b). 
28 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
30 See EPA, PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS—DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL 
PROGRAM GUIDANCE #84, at 6 (2012), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/ 
class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hfdieselfuelsguidance508.pdf. 
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sources.”31 The real story, however, is far more complicated, far more 
political, and far more troubling.  
In the early 1990s, the EPA considered fracking “to be a well stimulation 
technique associated with production and therefore not subject to [regula-
tion under the] UIC [program].” 32  In 1994, the Legal Environmental 
Assistance Foundation (LEAF) sued to compel the EPA to begin regulating 
fracking under the UIC program.33 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit found that fracking “obviously falls” within the class of activities 
Congress intended to regulate under the UIC program.34 
The EPA began the study on coalbed methane wells, to which Professor 
Spence refers, in 1999.35 When President George W. Bush took office in 
2001, with the study still ongoing, he assigned Vice President Dick Cheney, 
former CEO of Halliburton,36 to lead the National Energy Policy Develop-
ment Group (the “Energy Task Force”).37 The Energy Task Force busied 
itself preparing a “new national energy policy.”38 Records showed that while 
drafting this new policy, Vice President Cheney “held at least 40 meetings . . . 
most of them [with representatives] from energy-producing industries,” 
before meeting with a single representative from an environmental interest 
group.39 The Task Force eventually “recommend[ed] that the President 
direct the Secretaries of Energy and the Interior to promote enhanced oil 
and gas recovery from existing wells through new technology.”40  
The EPA study, issued in 2004, reported that “the injection of hydraulic 
fracturing fluids into [coalbed methane] wells pose[d] little or no threat to 
[underground sources of drinking water] and does not justify additional 
 
31 Spence, supra note 11, at 450 (footnote omitted). 
32 See Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/ 
uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm (last updated May 9, 2012). 
33 See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997). 
34 Id. at 1474. 
35 See Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, supra note 32. 
36 Though Halliburton did not invent fracking, the company was the first to patent and 
commercially market the technique. See CARL T. MONTGOMERY & MICHAEL B. SMITH, NSI 
TECHNOLOGIES, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 27 (2010), available at http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/ 
archives/2010/12/10Hydraulic.pdf. 
37 See generally NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRON-
MENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2001), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/ 
publications/press/2001/nep/national_energy_policy.pdf. 
38 See Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s Energy 
Report, WASH. POST (July 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
07/17/AR2007071701987_pf.html. 
39 See id.  
40 NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., supra note 37, at 5-20.  
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study at this time.”41 But the report did not recommend a categorical 
exemption for fracking, and the EPA, in conversations with Bush Admin-
istration officials, opposed the exemption’s broad language.42  However, 
according to a high official from the EPA at the time, the Bush Administra-
tion communicated “clearly” that it “did not want [the EPA] to take a 
formal position of opposition to the exemption.”43 Moreover, an EPA 
whistleblower claimed that the EPA’s conclusions were “scientifically 
unsound and contrary to the purposes of the law.”44 The whistleblower 
asserted that the EPA had “conducted limited research” and that, while the 
study was peer-reviewed, five of the seven reviewers had conflicts of 
interest.45 In response to the whistleblower’s letter, Representative Henry 
Waxman of California requested that the EPA Inspector General examine 
“whether political considerations influenced the agency’s conclusions,”46 but 
Congress passed the EPAct—fracking exemption and all—before any 
investigation took place.47 
In 2011, the Environmental Working Group, a research and advocacy 
organization, uncovered a 1987 EPA report that concluded that fracking in a 
natural gas well in West Virginia had contaminated an underground 
drinking water source.48 The report indicated that the individual examples 
it provided were meant to be “fairly illustrative of practices and conditions” 
throughout various zones including Appalachia.49 Yet the EPA’s 2004 study 
 
41 OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING WATER, EPA, 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF 
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF 
COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2004), available at http://water.epa.gov/ 
type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_coalbedmethanestudy.cfm. 
42 Abraham Lustgarten, Former Bush EPA Official Says Fracking Exemption Went Too Far; 
Congress Should Revisit, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/former-
bush-epa-official-says-fracking-exemption-went-too-far. 
43 Id. 
44 Letter from Weston Wilson, Employee, EPA, to Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator, et al. 1 (Oct. 8, 
2004), available at http://latimes.image2.trb.com/lanews/media/acrobat/2004-10/14647025.pdf.  
45 Id. 
46 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, U.S. Congressman,, to Nikki L. Tinsley, Inspector Gen-
eral, EPA 2 (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/ 
20041014163542-63301.pdf. 
47 See Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 10, at 170-79 (providing a more detailed account 
of the controversy surrounding the EPA report).  
48 EPA, MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, at IV-22 
(1987), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=20012D4P.pdf. 
49 Id. at IV-11; see also Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and Concern There May Be More, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/04natgas.html?pagewanted=all 
(offering detailed background information on the 1987 report). 
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does not mention the 1987 report, nor did Congress consider it during 
hearings concerning the fracking exemption in the EPAct.50 
B. Managing Wastewater under the RCRA and Information 
Disclosure under the EPCRA 
Like the SDWA, both the RCRA and the EPCRA offer clear answers to 
federalism-choice questions: Congress enacted the RCRA as a “cradle to 
grave” regulatory framework for managing hazardous wastes,51 and the 
EPCRA as a comprehensive regime requiring companies to disclose infor-
mation related to the storage and use of hazardous and toxic chemicals.52 
And as with the SDWA, administrative regulation pursuant to both the 
RCRA and the EPCRA exempt fracking from their purview. In passing 
amendments to the RCRA in 1980, Congress temporarily exempted oil and 
gas exploration and production wastes from regulation under the statute.53 
The EPA later concluded that federal regulation under the RCRA was 
unnecessary, and that regulatory goals would be better served by strength-
ening the UIC permitting process and passing regulations under another 
subsection.54 And use of fracking fluids, like other oil and gas exploration 
and production activities, are exempt from the EPCRA’s reporting require-
ments. 55  Neither of these exemptions reflects a principled federalism 
analysis of the type advanced by Professor Spence.  
Thus, Congress has already acted to federalize fracking regulation. But, 
due to a toxic blend of agency capture, flawed research, and shortsighted 
administrative decisions, the federal government’s leadership in fracking 
regulation has been paralyzed. New administrative findings could change all 
of this quickly,56 but the challenge for Professor Spence remains. Coming 
 
50 Recent research confirms that fracking can contaminate underground drinking water. See 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., EPA, EPA/600/R-00/000, INVESTIGATION OF GROUND 
WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING 33 (draft 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf 
(reporting groundwater contamination near wells using fracking service). 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(4) (2006) (regulating the creation, transport, and disposition of 
hazardous wastes). 
52 See id. § 11022(d)(2). 
53 See id. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1981). 
54 Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development 
and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446-47 (July 6, 1988). 
55 See 40 C.F.R. § 372.23 (2011). The EPA demands that industries classified by certain 
Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SICs) must adhere to specified reporting requirements. 
However, “Major Group 13: Oil and Gas Extraction” is not one of the SICs included. Id. 
56 The EPA is currently conducting a new study of fracking’s potential impacts on drinking 
water, with a preliminary report to be issued late this year and a final report in 2014. See generally 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., EPA, EPA/600/R-11/122, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL 
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on the heels of such a bewildering and compromised process, the status quo 
is hardly a “neutral” starting point. And Professor Spence must say more 
about why Congress got it wrong when it chose to regulate underground 
drinking water and hazardous waste.57  
Of course, even if these exemptions were undone, regulation would still 
be carried out primarily by the states under the SDWA’s and the RCRA’s 
cooperative federalism regimes. Such regimes are designed to capture the 
benefits of decentralized regulation without sacrificing the core goals of 
public health and environmental protection that undergird federal environ-
mental law. 
II. FRACKING AND FEDERALISM CHOICE 
Several rationales dominate arguments in favor of federalization of envi-
ronmental law: the need to address the interrelated problems of interstate 
externalities, the “race to the bottom,” and NIMBYism (not in my back-
yard); the economic efficiencies gained through federal uniformity; the 
benefits of pooling resources in order to gather technical and scientific 
expertise; creating durable rules, and providing for enforcement; the 
potential for greater diversity of interest-group participation; and the 
mobilization around national moral imperatives.58 A different set of factors 
dominates arguments in favor of decentralization: increased democratic 
participation and responsiveness to local preferences; the ability to tailor 
 
IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES (2011), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/HF_Study__Plan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf. If the EPA finds that 
fracking does contaminate drinking water, the regulatory field could change dramatically. 
In addition, environmental groups have filed a number of petitions seeking more immediate 
federal action. See Petition to Add Oil and Gas Extraction Industry, Standard Industrial 
Classification Code 13, to the List of Facilities Required to Report Under the Toxic Release 
Inventory, from Erica Schaeffer, Executive Director, Envtl. Integrity Project, to Lisa P. Jackson, 
Administrator, EPA (Oct. 24, 2012), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/news_ 
reports/documents/2012_10_24TRIPetitionFINALSIGNED.pdf; Citizen Petition Under Toxic 
Substances Control Act Regarding the Chemical Substances and Mixtures Used in Oil and Gas 
Exploration or Production, from Deborah Goldberg & Megan Klein, Earthjustice, to Lisa P. 
Jackson, Administrator, EPA (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/ 
fracking_petition.pdf; Petition for Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 6974(a) of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act Concerning the Regulation of Wastes Associated with the 
Exploration, Development, or Production of Crude Oil or Natural Gas or Geothermal Energy, 
from Natural Res. Def. Council, to Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, EPA (Sept. 8, 2010), available 
at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_10091301a.pdf. 
57 See Spence, supra note 11, at 807-08. 
58 See Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being Green”: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and 
the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 854-55 (2010) (comparing arguments for 
centralization and decentralization in environmental law).  
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decisions to local environmental conditions; regulatory and policy innova-
tion; adaptive management or other experimentalist or “new governance” 
regimes; and interjurisdictional competition that can lead to economically 
efficient regulation. 59  A balanced federalism might presumptively favor 
state regulation, but it should still look at both sides of the equation before 
deciding which level of governance is appropriate.  
Professor Spence targets four pro-federalization arguments—managing 
interstate spillovers, preventing a “race to the bottom,” accommodating 
industry’s potential desire or need for uniform national standards, and 
promoting important national interests60—and concludes both that there 
may be a limited cause for federal regulation in areas in which the federal 
government already employs its regulatory authority, and that new studies 
may reveal that more federal regulation is justified.61 In response, I will 
augment Professor Spence’s analysis by addressing relevant “pro-
decentralization” arguments, reframing the question of interstate spillovers 
in light of fracking’s cumulative impact, and identifying the practice’s 
potentially transformative effects, especially on rural America. These effects 
make fracking a matter of true, national concern. 
A. The Benefits of Decentralized Fracking Regulation 
Opponents of federal regulation of fracking frequently advance two pro-
decentralization arguments: the ability of state and local governments to 
tailor decisions to local environmental conditions and the idea that states 
may serve as regulatory and technical testing grounds.62 Neither offers a 
persuasive case for giving states primary authority to regulate fracking. 
First, some have argued, and Professor Spence suggests,63 that the geo-
logical differences among shale plays position state agencies to better 
understand the relevant local environmental conditions, and so they should 
set the local standards.64 But this argument ignores the fact that the SDWA 
employs a cooperative-federalism approach in which the states and the 
federal government share authority. 65  In a delegated UIC permitting 
 
59 Id. at 855-56. 
60 See Spence, supra note 11, at 462-65, 478-506. 
61 See id. at 506-08. 
62 See id. at 435. 
63 See, e.g., id. at 492-93 (arguing that states may be best suited to address groundwater 
contamination caused by fracking because those are risks that directly impact locals). 
64  See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, RESOLUTION TO RETAIN STATE  
AUTHORITY OVER HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (n.d.), available at http://www.alecexposed.org/w/ 
images/9/9e/3E11-Resolution_to_Retain_State_Authority_over_Hydraulic_Fracturing_Exposed.pdf. 
65 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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program, state officials would be charged with taking account of local 
geological conditions while meeting minimum standards set by the federal 
government.66 Thus, in the federal regime conceptualized in extant regula-
tory regimes, local geological knowledge would be adequately brought to 
bear on permitting decisions.  
Second, opponents of federal regulation argue that the diversity of state 
approaches to fracking regulation will lead to technical and regulatory 
experimentation, and ultimately, maximum efficiency. Thus, they argue, the 
federal government should seek to preserve this experimentation.67 Certainly, 
some states are taking measures to improve safety: New Mexico and North 
Dakota have imposed wastewater management requirements; a number of 
states have updated well-casing requirements; Colorado revised its oil and gas 
code to include buffer zones around public water supplies, improved remedia-
tion requirements, and additional wildlife protections, among other measures; 
and New York has proposed stringent environmental protections and im-
posed a ban while it conducts a comprehensive environmental review of high-
volume fracking in the Marcellus Shale.68 But state regulatory regimes remain 
highly inconsistent, with some states actively seeking to address the problems 
generated by fracking, but even more not.69  
In addition, an important component of the “state laboratories” argu-
ment is that the information being generated in one state is shared and 
utilized in others. There is little evidence that such collaboration is taking 
place with fracking regulation.70 On the other hand, a centralized regime 
under federal law would likely produce a far greater amount of resource 
pooling, technical and regulatory information sharing, and knowledge genera-
tion than what is currently taking place under the decentralized approach. 
 
66 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 146.21–24 (2011). 
67 See, e.g., Spence, supra note 11, at 435 (suggesting that the states’ varied “regulatory ap-
proaches represent a series of experiments from which all can learn”). 
68 See generally HANNAH WISEMAN & FRANCIS GRADIJAN, CTR. FOR GLOBAL ENER-
GY, INT’L ARBITRATION & ENVTL. LAW, REGULATION OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT, 
INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 141-42 (2012) (addressing regulations in a sample of 
sixteen states that produce or are likely to produce gas or oil from shales or tight sands). 
69 See, e.g., Wiseman, Untested Waters, supra note 10, at 167 (discussing the various tiers at 
which states are regulating fracking operations). 
70 The websites fracfocus.org and STRONGERinc.org (State Review of Oil & Gas Envi-
ronmental Regulations) offer convenient forums for states to share information about their 
successes and failures in regulating fracking operations. However, the only instance I am of aware 
of in which a state agency has made explicit reference to another state’s regulations was to 
demonstrate how the other state had fallen short. See Fact Sheet: What We Learned from Pennsylva-
nia, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (July 2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/ 
75410.html (describing New York Department of Environmental Conservation officials’ visit to a 
Pennsylvania fracking site that was experiencing equipment failure). 
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B. Interstate Externalities and Cumulative Impacts 
Fracking is rapidly expanding across the United States. Companies in 
Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and 
Wyoming have collectively reported that 18,158 wells were “readied for 
production or were newly producing” between April, 2011 and the end of 
2011.71 According to another report, in 2012, there will be a nineteen-percent 
increase in the worldwide market for fracking.72 Some states, such as North 
Dakota and Pennsylvania, have seen particularly dramatic increases in the 
scale of fracking operations.73  
The equation is simple: The more wells there are, the higher the risk of 
both direct interstate pollution 74  and cumulative impacts that warrant 
federal response.75 Accordingly, in attempting to manage both short-term 
and cumulative impacts on communities, land use, wildlife, and ecologies, 
regulators “should pay greater attention to the combination of impacts from 
multiple drilling, production and delivery activities . . . and make efforts 
to plan for shale development impacts on a regional scale.”76 Limiting such 
regional planning efforts to individual states might be easier politically, but 
given the sheer number of fracking operations, and the fact that many shale 
plays are located close to and across state borders,77 it makes little sense if 
the goal is to account for actual direct and cumulative impacts.  
 
71 See Benjamin Haas et al., Fracking Hazards Obscured in Failure to Disclose Wells, BLOOM-
BERG (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/fracking-hazards-obscured-in-
failure-to-disclose-wells.html.  
72 Joe Carroll, Fracking Market to Grow 19% to $37 Billion Worldwide in 2012, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-19/frack-market-to-grow-19-in-2012-to-
37-billion-correct-.html. 
73 See id. (discussing new production on the Bakken and Marcellus shale formations, which 
lie beneath North Dakota and Pennsylvania respectively). 
74 See, e.g., Press Release, Douglas F. Ganser, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Gansler 
Notifies Chesapeake Energy of the State’s Intent to Sue for Endangering the Health of Citizens and 
the Environment (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2011/050211.html 
(describing the State’s intent to file a suit and seek injunctive relief and civil penalties against an 
energy company for releasing thousands of gallons of fracking fluids into a major river). 
75 ROYAL SOC’Y & ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, SHALE GAS EXTRACTION IN THE UK: A REVIEW OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 55 (2012) available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/shale-gas/2012-06-28-Shale-gas.pdf (arguing that British regulators 
need to pay attention to how “risks [would] scale up if a shale gas industry develops nationwide”).  
76 See SHALE GAS SUBCOMM., SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., THE SEAB SHALE 
GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE NINETY-DAY REPORT 3 (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081111_90_day_report.pdf. 
77 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 3. 
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C. The National Interest in Federal Fracking Regulation 
In discussing the national interests in federalizing fracking regulation, 
Professor Spence examines the implications of natural gas extraction for the 
nation’s emergency preparedness, national security, energy security, air 
quality, and climate change policy, all of which generally support the promo-
tion of the fracking industry.78 Yet nothing about this national interest in 
natural gas implies that federalization of fracking is inappropriate. Such a 
conclusion depends on the presumption that the costs imposed by federal 
regulation will outweigh the benefits gained by it, which is a typical argument 
made by industry insiders, but one that runs counter to the evidence.79 
What’s more, Professor Spence’s examination misses what may be the 
most significant long-term impact of fracking: the transformation of large 
swaths of rural and small town America. Townspeople across the country 
have voiced concern that fracking will erode the historic qualities of their 
hometowns.80 Moreover, many local officials and leaders have stepped in 
to put a stop to fracking in their communities before it even begins. In 
New York, “dozens of counties and towns . . . have imposed moratori-
ums or bans on fracking.”81 Communities in North Carolina are also 
proceeding cautiously. 82  And in Pennsylvania, the State’s attempt to 
preempt local fracking bans has reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.83 
 
78 See Spence, supra note 11, at 497-504. 
79 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS 
AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, 
AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 95 tbl.B-1 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/legislative/reports/2010_Benefit_Cost_Report.pdf (providing cost–benefit information 
for a host of federal, regulatory regimes). 
80 See, e.g., The Oil Boom Is Destroying Small Towns Across America, BUSINESSINSIDER (Mar. 
2, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-oil-boom-is-destroying-small-towns-across-america-
2012-3 (describing how violent crime and traffic jams accompanying the boom in fracking 
operations have “turned [a] little town upside down”). 
81 Paul Gallay, Hydrofracking: A Bad Bet for the Environment—and the Economy, HUFFINGTON 
POST BLOG (Jan. 5, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-gallay/fracking-
environment_b_1186998.html; see also William J. Kemble, Rosendale Schedules Hearing on Law That Would 
Ban Fracking in Town, DAILY FREEMAN (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/ 
articles/2012/08/09/news/doc5024299153a3b154598681.txt (citing fracking’s potential impact on “small-
town character” as one of several reasons the Town Board of Rosedale, NY wants to ban the practice). 
82 Ted M. Natt, Jr., Fracking: Promise—and Peril, THE PILOT (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www. 
thepilot.com/news/2011/aug/08/fracking-promise-and-perils/ (discussing North Carolina’s slow move 
toward possibly legalizing fracturing in the state).  
83 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently noted probable jurisdiction. Appeal Docket 
Sheet at 10, Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, No. 64 MAP 2012 (Pa. Aug. 8, 2012), 
available at http://ujsportal.pacourts.us/docketsheets/SupremeCourtReport.aspx?docketNumber= 
64%20MAP%202012. 
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A full account of the impact of fracking operations on rural America is 
far beyond the scope of this Response. Nonetheless, given that most 
fracking occurs in rural areas, that the increasing scale of operations results 
in an increased risk of both direct pollution and cumulative environmental 
impacts in those areas, and that rural and small town America’s cultural and 
historic landscape may be significantly threatened by the continuing 
expansion of the industry, concerns over the fate of rural communities are 
simply another reason pure federalism might not be the best tack. 
CONCLUSION 
The regulation of fracking is a hot button issue, and debates will contin-
ue to play out in federal and state legislatures, agencies, and courtrooms, not 
to mention on the front pages of newspapers, in the coming years. Professor 
Spence’s Article is a serious, first-to-market attempt to situate this highly 
charged political controversy in the frame of federalism theory. In a future 
article, Professor Spence should further develop the foundations of existing 
exemptions and explore how they factor into his analysis. Moreover, I hope 
he will consider some of the issues I raise regarding the merits of decentral-
ization of fracking regulation in practice (or lack thereof), the reality of 
cumulative impacts, and fracking’s effects on rural America, all of which I 
believe counterbalance his argument. Nevertheless, Professor Spence has 
initiated an important and previously overlooked theoretical inquiry into 
the proper scale of fracking regulation. 
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